Why Blast Isn't a True L2: A Code-Level Reality Check

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Why Blast Isn't a True L2: A Code-Level Reality Check

Why Blast Isn’t a True L2: A Code-Level Reality Check

The Multisig Elephant in the Room

Let’s start with the headline fact: Blast deposits are controlled by a 35 multisig of unknown entities. Through forensic analysis of the deployment transactions (0x52c31…), we see:

  • Proxy and implementation contracts deployed via Gnosis Safe
  • 5 freshly created wallets as signers (who exactly? Nobody knows)
  • UUPSUpgradeable functionality allowing code changes without migration

Translation: Five faceless parties can rewrite contract logic whenever they coordinate three signatures.

The Upgradeability Paradox

The technical truth? Most major L2s retain similar upgrade mechanisms during their growth phase. Optimism, Arbitrum, zkSync - all have council-controlled backdoors for emergency fixes. But here’s where Blast diverges catastrophically:

solidity // Sample risk vector from Blast’s _setMainnetBridge function require(_mainnetBridge.code.length > 0); // That’s it. No further checks.

This lax validation means any contract (even malicious ones) can be designated to drain $200M+ in staked ETH/DAI overnight.

The Brutal Truth About ‘Not Being an L2’

The real scandal isn’t the multisig - it’s what Blast doesn’t have:

✅ Testnet ❌
✅ Transactions ❌
✅ Data bridges ❌
✅ Fraud proofs ❌
✅ Rollup architecture ❌

It’s essentially a yield-bearing smart wallet with delusions of grandeur. Users can’t withdraw until:

  1. Strangers deploy new contracts
  2. Those contracts include withdrawal functions
  3. Funds get migrated (voluntarily)

The so-called ‘native yield’ comes from funneling assets into protocols like Lido through this rickety pipeline.

Risk Assessment: Would They Rug?

Probability ≠ possibility. While I’d wager against outright theft (the reputational cost outweighs $200M), the structural vulnerabilities should give any institutional investor pause:

  1. Code upgrades could introduce silent exploits
  2. MainnetBridge approvals enable instant asset seizure
  3. Zero transparency about signer identities or governance roadmap

My advice? Treat this as an experimental DeFi product - not infrastructure deserving of nine-figure TVL.

BlockchainMaven

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Hot comment (1)

무지개고래
무지개고래무지개고래
1 month ago

블라스트는 L2가 아니라 ‘자기만의 꿈’

너무도 정직한 코드 분석이네…

5명의 익명 멀티시그가 지배하는 블라스트? ‘내가 뭘 해도 상관없어’라는 느낌이 강하다.

출금은 ‘기적’이다

출금하려면…

  1. 외부 사람이 새로운 계약을 올리고
  2. 그게 출금 기능 있어야 하고,
  3. 그걸 직접 수락해야 한다고? 이거 뭐야… 테스트넷도 없는데 L2라니?

‘유저 자산’은 그냥 ‘사용자 예치물’

실제로는 유효성 검증도 없고, fraudulent bridge로 바로 $200M 날릴 수 있다구? ‘자신감 있게 말해보세요’ 하면 진짜 나올 것 같아.

결론: 이건 실험적인 디파 제품일 뿐. TVL 9자릿수 받을 만큼 신뢰할 수 없다.

너무 말 안 듣는 거 보여주나? 你们咋看?评论区开战啦!

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